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Jorge Vinuales from the University of Cambridge observed in his 
working paper on “Law and the Anthropocene” that law is founded on a 
series of core concepts, such as, “legal personality, representation, 
obligation, debt, causality or damage” (CEENRG Working Papers 2016-
4, page 49). This led him to note that a “significant problem” faced by 
environmental law is how to flesh out these core concepts in relation to 
the protection of the environment (page 53). For example, should we 
regard natural resources (e.g. rivers or mountains) as “subjects” of 
environmental law with their “own interests and capacity to act 
(through representation)”, or merely as the “objects” of environmental 
law – to be protected either “directly” as specific natural resources, or 
“indirectly” via the protection of the environment generally (page 53). 
This article interrogates these perspectives by reference to recent New 
Zealand developments. 
The concept of personality 
New Zealand jurisprudence has been focused on the concept of 
personality since Sir John Salmond published his seminal work on this 
topic in 1893 (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1893). Salmond 
developed his theory of legal personality to address issues regarding 
the rights and obligations of corporations in an era before the law had 
been settled by the House of Lords judgment in Salomon v Salomon 
[1896] UKHL 1, [1897] AC 22. In the positivist and utilitarian tradition 
of Bentham and Austin (and more recently Hart), Salmond considered 
that attributing personality was the ultimate rule of recognition. In his 
view, attribution was the “siginficant” and “exclusive” point of 
difference between natural persons who were regarded by the law as 
possessing rights and obligations that could be recognized by the 
courts, and non-natural persons (page 329). He developed this theory 
via the “fiction” that law can attribute personality to “beings” whether 
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“real or imaginery” in situations where (absent fiction) there would 
otherwise be no attribution of personality “in fact” (page 329). 
However, based on the German philosophical writings of Otto von 
Gierke and others, Salmond was troubled by the question about 
whether a corporation was a “real thing” or merely a “group organism” 
comprising the shareholders (page 350). This question was answered 
affirmatively, first, by Lord Halsbury in Salomon where he stated: 
If it was a real thing; if it had a legal existence, and if consequently the 
law attributed to it certain rights and liabilities in its constitution as a 
company, it appears to me to follow as a consequence that it is 
impossible to deny the validity of the transactions into which it has 
entered. ([1897] AC 22 at 33). 
Secondly, by the American realist, John Chapman Gray, who stated: 
It should be observed that even if a corporation be a real thing, it is yet 
a fictitious person for it has no real will, but it would be a fictitious 
person only as an idiot or a ship is a fictitious person. (John Chapman 
Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law (2nd edn The Macmillan Co, 
New York, 1927) 53). 
More recently, Alex Frame drew attention to the “revolutionary and 
immaginative” way that Salmond used “legal forms to achieve 
utilitarian objectives” (Alex Frame “Property and the Treaty of 
Waitangi” in Janet McLean (ed), Property and the Constitution (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 1999) 236). For example, he made the connection 
between Salmond’s willingness to attribute legal personality to non-
natural persons and Maori culture and traditions where it is normal to 
regard geographic features, such as, rivers and mountains “as tupuna, 
as ancestors” as a result of the close association of iwi, hapu and 
whanua with particular features. This dynamic conception of 
personality was captured by Salmond in his statement that: 
A legal person is any subject-matter to which the law attributes a 
merely legal or fictitious personality. This extension, for good and 
sufficient reasons, of the conception of personality beyond the limits of 
fact – this recognition of persons who are not men – is one of the most 
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noteworthy feats of the legal imagination. (Jurisprudence (7th edn Sweet 
& Maxwell, London, 1924) 336). 
Frame’s insight led him to observe that extending legal personality to 
certain geographic features could provide a mechanism for mediating 
Maori grievances under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 claims 
settlement process. For example, he stated: 
The river would become not the object of law, but a legal subject in its 
own right and with its own rights – it would not be owned by anyone. 
The real question would of course then become “who speaks for the 
river in the assertion of its rights, and what are those rights to be?”: the 
answer might depend on which aspect of the river’s legal personality, or 
which rights, were being asserted or challenged on any given occasion. 
The persons, or combinations of persons entitled to speak for the river 
on particular issues would need to be settled by careful investigation, 
negotiation, and statutory enactment. (page 237) 
While this “suggestion” was not original (as Frame acknowledged by 
citing Christopher Stone’s seminal article “Should Trees Have 
Standing? Towards Legal Rights for Material Agents” (1972) 45 
Southern California Law Review 450), Frame’s re-articulation of this 
theme repackaged it in a New Zealand context that transcended the 
divide between English common law and Maori tikanga world-views 
and arguably provided the catalyst for subsequent Treaty settlements. 
For Stone, “incorporating” geographical features (page 475) and 
appointing a guardian ad litem to protect and enforce the rights of 
“rightless” (page 453) or “incompetent” (page 464) things was critical 
for three reasons: 
… first, that the thing can institute legal actions at its behest; second, 
that in determining the granting of legal relief, the courts must take 
injury to it into account; and, third, that relief must run to the benefit of 
it. (page 458) 
In advancing this theory, he drew analogies with the appointment of 
guardians to litigate on behalf of minors, or to manage the affairs of 
humans in a vegetative state or insolvent companies, while noting that 
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the law sometimes uses different labels (e.g. conservator or 
committee) to describe the guardians (page 464). However, Stone’s 
real focus was on the ability of the guardians to bring actions in the 
courts in tort (whether for damages or injunctive relief) or against 
public authorities for the prerogative orders in judicial review, rather 
than the semantic terminology that could be used to describe the 
guardians. Additionally, he also proposed (page 465) that where there 
is no special purpose legislation in place that accords legal personality 
to geographical featues and appoints guardians - then other legal 
persons (e.g. an incorporated environmental NGO) should be able to 
petition the courts to be appointed as the guardian for a specific 
geographical feature. 
Critically, Frame’s “suggestion” that legal personality should be 
extended to certain geographical features also .. This linkage was an 
important step in legal development because the previous legislative 
focus on protecting geographical features had concentrated exclusively 
on the question of representation. 
Representation and the environment 
Providing a representative voice for any geographical features will 
therefore be critical if they are to be regarded as legal subjects. For 
example, the Conservation Act 1987 (as amended by the Conservation 
Law Reform Act 1990) includes provision for the appointment of 
Guardians for Lakes Manapouri, Monowai, and Te Anau by the Minister 
of Conservation. Their functions include making recommendations to 
the Minister regarding the “environmental, ecological, and social 
effects” arising from the operation of the Manapouri-Te Anau hydro-
electric power scheme, with a specific focus on the lake shorelines and 
the rivers flowing in and out of the lakes, and the effects of the power 
scheme on social, conservation, recreation, tourism, and amenity 
values (s 6X(2)(a)); and making recommendations to the Ministers of 
Conservation and Economic Development regarding the operational 
guidelines for the levels of the lakes that are designed to strike a 
balance between the “ecological … and recreational values of their 
vulnerable shorelines” on the one hand, and optimizing hyrdo-electric 
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power generation on the other hand (Manapouri-Te Anau Development 
Act 1963, s 4A). Significantly, the establishment of the Guardians for 
the lakes in 1973 (originally as a non-statutory body) was the result of 
the Save Manapouri Campaign against raising the lake levels. Similar 
provision is made for the appointment of lake guardians under the 
Lake Wanaka Preservation Act 1973. 
Similarly, the Fiordland Marine Guardians perfom an advisory role 
under s 13 of the Fiordland (Te Moana o Atawhenua) Marine 
Management Act 2005 regarding “the effectiveness of management 
measures adopted in relation to the Fiordland Marine Area”, the 
adverse effects of any activities occurring outside the area, and any 
“likely threats” to the area (e.g. from invasive pest species). 
Additionally, the Guardians are also required to assist with 
disseminating information about the area, monitoring the state of the 
environment, and compliance and enforcement planning. It is also for 
note that although Ngai Tahu are given the right to nominate one of 
the Guardians, the establishment of the marine Guardians appears to 
reflect extant informal community and sectoral interest in the 
management of the area. Similar provision is made for the 
appointment of marine guardians under the Kaikoura Marine 
Management Act 2014. 
While the lake and marine guardians appointed under these statutes 
play important advisory roles, they fall short of the right to participate 
in proceedings before courts and tribunals relating to these 
geographical features. For example, the Parliamentary Commissioner 
for the Environment is given a general right to be heard in proceedings 
regarding any consent application made under the statutes pertaining 
to the New Zealand environment listed in the schedule to the 
Environment Act 1986 (s 21). Significantly, the Commissioner’s 
functions do not expressly extend to initiating civil or criminal 
enforcement proceedings, and the Commissioner (like the Guardians) 
will therefore need to rely on any general statutory provisions 
regarding standing in those instances. General provision is, however, 
made in s 316(1) of the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) for any 
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person to commence civil proceedings for an enforcement order (akin 
to an injunction) to be made by the Environment Court. Likewise, the 
RMA contains liberal standing provisions for any person to participate 
in publicly notified processes before local authorities (and on appeal 
before the Environment Court and the High Court) regarding the 
preparation of policy statements and plans and the determination of 
resource consent applications (RMA, sch 1, cl 6, and s 96). 
Proposals to establish environmental guardians have not, however, 
always met with success. For example, while the Waitangi Tribunal 
recommended that guardians should be appointed in relation to the 
protection of the Manukau Harbourt (Manukau Report 1985 (Wai 8) 
77-80), the subsequent discussion paper on the restoration of the 
harbour prepared by the Ministry for the Environment noted that 
guardianship was a European concept that was not appropriate for use 
in the context of kaitiakitanga, because guardianship was focused on 
environmental protection whereas kaitiakitanga was considered to be 
be much more broadly focused on the interests of the relevant tangata 
whenua (Ministry for the Environment, The Manukau Harbour: A 
strategy for restoration and future management (Ministry for the 
Environment, Wellington, 1987) 5-6). 
Generally, during the period before 2010 the settlement of Treaty 
claims resulted (where relevant) in statutory acknowledgements being 
recorded in special purpose settlement legislation and sch 11 of the 
RMA regarding specific relationships with particular geographical 
features. Local authorities are placed under a duty to have regard to 
the statutory acknowledgement, as a mandatory consideration, when 
deciding who is affected by a resource consent application under s 
95E(2)(c) in relation to the possible notification of the application, and 
when the Environment Court on appeal decides whether a person 
should be allowed to participate in an appeal under s 274(6) on the 
ground that the person has an interest in the proceedings greater than 
the general public. While these provisions bring the question of Maori 
participation in RMA proceedings clearly into focus they are limited in 
their ambit because typically less than 5 per cent of applications are 
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notified in some way, and because they do not provide a right to 
represent the specific geographical features acknowledged in sch 11 
across the full spectrum of environmental statutes. 
Subsequent Treaty settlement statutes have departed radically from 
the previous pattern of statutory acknowledgements, and have 
included governance mechanisms in relation to specific geographical 
features. For example, the Ngati Tuwharetoa, Raukawa, and Te Arawa 
River Iwi Waikato River Act 2010; the Nga Wai o Maniapoto (Waipa 
River) Act 2012; and the Raukawa Claims Settlement Act 2014 all 
provide for co-governance of river catchments. The Waikato-Tainui 
Raupatu Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010, however, 
provides for co-management of the river catchment. While 
commentary on these mechanisms (Rachael Harris, “A legal identity for 
the Urewera: The changing face of co-governance in the central North 
Island” [2015] RM Theory & Practice 148, 151) distinguished between 
the two mechanisms, with co-governance being seen as a more 
authoritative concept that is concerned with setting “the primary 
direction to achieve … restoration” of the relevant catchments, and 
with co-management being seen as the “collaborative partnership that 
implements the direction set under the co-governance framework”. 
However, the distinction appears to be more blurred in practice and 
nothing may actually turn on which label is used to describe the 
governance process embedded in the statute. For example, under this 
schema one could anticipate that the Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims 
(Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010 would be focused exclusively on 
implementation, whereas in practice the statute contains both 
governance and management mechanisms – including the vision and 
strategy in ss 9-21 that is given force and effect as part of the regional 
policy statement which sets out the resource management framework 
for the Waikato region. 
The significance of these management mechanisms, however, lies in 
their ability to involve Maori in strategic decision-making that will 
influence both the content and implementation (via resource consent 
decisions) of the policy statement and plan framework, and provide the 
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opportunity (at both stages) to protect specific geographical features of 
importance to them in relation to their culture and traditions. But 
notwithstanding the influence of these management mechanisms and 
the protection given to the specifc river catchments, the water bodies 
concerned remain the objects of the law rather than legal subjects in 
their own right. There is, therefore, little difference in practice between 
the representation and management methods used during the period 
1973-2014, because under both schemas the geographic features 
protected are objects of the law rather than legal subjects. 
Interestingly, both mechanisms move beyond the RMA and also apply 
to the Conservation Act 1987 and the Fisheries Act 1986. 
Geographical features as legal subjects 
The Treaty settlement process is dynamic (as noted by Frame above 
(page 237)) and continues to provide a catalyst for the evolution of 
New Zealand law. For example, s 11 of the Te Urewera Act 2014 
declares the Te Urewera mountain ranges to be a legal entity and 
provides the mountains with “all the rights, powers, duties, and 
liabilities of a legal person”. Effectively, s 11 incorporates Te Urewera. 
This position is underscored by vesting the fee simple title to the 
mountain ranges in Te Urewera itself. The statute also provides for the 
appointment of a Board (pt 2 of the statute) to represent Te Urewera 
by exercising the rights, powers, and duties given to the mountain 
ranges under s 11. The Board’s functions under s 18 include the 
preparation and approval of a management plan, to promote and 
advocate for Te Urewera’s interests in statutory processes and before 
public authorities, and to take any other action considered appropriate 
for achieving the purpose of the statute – namely, to preserve Te 
Urewera in perpetuity in its natural state (ss 4 and 5). The 
management plan prepared under s 46 of the statute is required (inter 
alia) to identify the values regarding indigenous ecosystems, cultural 
heritage, recreation, landform, and freshwater quality that will be used 
to guide how activities within the Te Urewera mountain ranges should 
be carried out and inform how any adverse effects should be 
minimized. 
Environmental Frontiers IV Colloquium, University of Tasmania, Hobart, 6 - 
7 February 2018  
 
9 
Similarly, s 14 of the Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims 
Settlement) Act 2017 declares the river to be a legal person. Again, 
effectively incorporating the river. In particular, s 12 of the statute 
recognizes that: 
Te Awa Tupua is an indivisible and living whole, comprising the 
Whanganui River from the mountains to the sea, incorporating all its 
physical and metaphysical elements. 
Statutory decision-makers are required to have regard to the status of 
the river, as defined by s 12, when exercising their functions, powers, 
and duties under sch 2 of the statute. Provision is made for the 
appointment of two Guardians (Te Pou Tupua), who are to act as the 
“human face” of the river (s 18). The Guardians are given a range of 
functions under s 19 of the statute, including, speaking on behalf of 
the river catchment, promoting and protecting its health and well-
being, participating in statutory processes, and taking any action 
reasonably necessary to perform these functions. Specifically, the 
Guardians are required by s 19(2)(a) to act in the best interests of the 
river and its intrinsic values (Tupua te Kawa). The fee simple estate of 
the Crown-owned parts of the river bed were also vested in Te Awa 
Tupua (the Whanganui River) under s 41 of the statute. 
Arguably, the principal differences between the Te Urewera and 
Whanganui River statutes is the more direct linguistic connection 
between the river Guardians and the concept of kaitiakitanga. 
Interestingly, a consequence of extending legal personality to 
geographic features is that s 29 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 (NZBORA) is engaged, which provides that: 
Except where the provisions of this Bill of Rights otherwise provide, the 
provisions of this Bill of Rights apply, so far as practicable, for the 
benefit of all legal persons as well as for the benefit of all natural 
persons. 
This also brings into play s 27 of NZBORA that provides for the right to 
justice, including, the observance of natural justice concerning any 
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public law decisions that may affect the “incorporated” geographical 
feature, and the right to apply for judicial review where the “rights, 
obligations, or interests” of the geographical feature are adversely 
affected by any public law decision. These rights are important 
adjuncts to the general capacity of corporations to “do any act, or 
enter into any transaction” for the purpose of carrying out its functions 
(Companies Act 1993, s 16(1); Local Government Act 2002, s 12(2)), 
or the general powers of the Board and the Guardians to take any 
other action considered appropriate for achieving the statutory purpose 
regarding the Te Urewera ranges or the Whanganui River. For 
example, Stone noted that the argument on behalf of the Mineral King 
Valley wilderness area in Sierra Club v Hickel 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 
1970) failed because of a lack of standing to pursue judicial review 
(Christopher D Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Law, Morality, and 
the Environment (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) 
xiii). The Court found that the Club did not mean: 
… that it is ‘aggreived’ or that it is ‘adversely affected’ within the 
meaning of the rules of standing. Nor does the fact that no one else 
appears on the scene who is in fact aggrieved and is willing or desirous 
of taking up the cudgels create a right in appellee. The right to sue does 
not inure to one who does not possess it, simply because there is no 
one else willing and able to assert it. (Emphasis added at 32). 
However, under the liberal rules of standing in New Zealand, the High 
Court in Moxon v Casino Control Authority (M324 & 325/99) held that 
responsible public interest groups representing a relevant aspect of the 
public interest (e.g. Environmental Defence Society) have a strong 
case for standing where the decision impugned will have community 
impact and, more importantly, that there will be a strong case for 
standing if there is no other realistic prospect of addressing legal 
issues of significant public interest. This provides a handle for anyone 
to pursue judicial review on behalf of any adversely affected 
geographical feature absent incorporation, or in cases where the 
guardian is unable or unwilling to challenge the decision. 
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The principle of kaitiakitanga has also been an integral part of the DNA 
of the RMA since its enactment in July 1991 (s 7(a)). In particular, 
kaitiakitanga is defined by s 2(1) of the RMA to mean: 
… the exercise of guardianship by the tangata whenua of an area in 
accordance with tikanga Maori in relation to natural and physical 
resources … 
It links particular people with specific geographic features through the 
media of genealogy and customs and traditions; and the values and 
practices of the iwi, hapu, and whanau associated with these features 
will inform decision making under the RMA (Ngai Te Hapu Inc v Bay of 
Plenty Regional Council [2017] NZEnvC 073 at [82]). Put simply, a 
principled approach will be required to ensure that the relationship of 
Maori with specific geographical features is provided for as part of the 
overall objective of achieving sustainable management (McGuire v 
Hastings District Council (2002) 8 ELRNZ 14 (PC)). For example, in 
Ngai Te Hapu regarding the proposal to leave the MV Rena wreck in 
situ on the Astrolabe/Otaiti reef, the Environment Court was required 
to ascertain the relationship of various iwi and hapu with the reef and 
to determine which of them exercised mana whenua (customary 
authority) over the reef, in order to identify the specific cultural values 
and practices that were (inter alia) used to assess the environmental 
effects of the proposed activity. This demonstrates the increasing 
importance of kaitiakitanga regarding the protection of specific 
geographical features from inappropriate use or development. 
Arguably, the approach in Ngai Te Hapu recognises Maori tikanga as 
rules of law. It is an example of an emerging trend in legal method 
that views Maori tikanga from a Maori perspective. Writing extra-
judicially, Justice Christian Whata described this method as “essential” 
to ensure “adherence to tikanga Maori” (Christian Whata ““Matauranga 
Maori” knowledge, comprehension and understanding: Reflection on 
lessons learnt and contemplation of the future” [2016] Resource 
Management Theory & Practice 21). In the same way, he also found 
that settlement statutes enacted to resolve Treaty of Waitangi claims 
are “transformative” (page 28). He focused in particular on the 
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Whanganui River legislation and the way that legal personality is 
attributed to the river and “intrinsic values which represent the 
essence of Te Awa Tupua” are set out in the statute. Whata stated: 
… the significance here lies in ratifying or making cognisable both the 
cultural processes that underpin tikanga itself, so that the assessment 
of Maori environmental issues is not so much an assessment of other 
effects on proven physical or metaphysical entities … but a question of 
weighing the significance of non-compliance with tikanga per se against 
the other matters identified by the RMA as relevant considerations. 
(page 28) 
Beyond that, Whata previously observed (again writing extra-judicially) 
that recognition of kaitiakitanga in the RMA is merely declaratory of the 
fused position at common law and under Maori tikanga (Justice 
Christian Whata, Salmon Lecture 2012, “Environmental Rights in a 
Time of Crisis: The Canterbury Experience” at [56]-[58]), which 
implies that kaitiakitanga will potentially be relevant across the broad 
spectrum of New Zealand law where the relationship of Maori with 
geographical features is engaged in some way. 
Attributing legal personality to mountains and rivers has also provided 
the catalyst for thinking about marine protected areas, for example, 
the 1.2 million hectare Hauraki Gulf Marine Park has been defined in 
non-statutory planning terms “as a being in its own right” and a 
mechanism for balancing competing interests in a holistic way (Sea 
Change, Hauraki Gulf Marine Spatial Plan (April 2017), 31). Similarly, 
Dr Ben France-Hudson from the University of Otago has suggested that 
attributing legal personality to the proposed 620,000 square kilometre 
Kermadec Ocean Sanctuary could provide a way to resolve the current 
judicial review proceedings concerning the establishment of the 
sanctuary and the Crown’s failure to consult with Maori fishing 
interests (Ben France-Hudson, “The Kermadec/Rangitahua Ocean 
Sanctuary: Expropriation-free but a breach of good faith” [2016] 
Resource Management Theory & Practice 55, 80-81). 
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Regarding certain geographic features as subjects of environmental 
law with their own interests and capacity to act through representation 
is radical. But arguably attributing legal personality to geographic 
features has its roots in Roman law and the influence exerted by 
Justinian’s code on canon law and common law “ideas of corporations” 
that were firmly rooted in the “notion of public benefit” (John Farrar, 
Corporate Governance: Theories, Principles and Practice (3rd edn, 
Oxford University Press, 2008) 23-24). 
Conclusions 
New Zealand law is dynamic and provides a philosophical foundation 
for attributing legal personality to “persons who are not men”. It has 
extended “representation” mechanisms to geographical features, such 
as, lakes, fiords, lakes, and (potentially) harbours. More recently, 
Treaty settlement statutes have developed the law even further 
through co-management techiques, and by attributing legal personality 
to certain geographic features, based on concepts of guardianship 
(kaitiakitanga). Arguably, the Treaty settlement process has been 
transformative in a constitutional way by changing the lens through 
which guardianship and the values that underpin it are viewed. The 
movement toward viewing Maori tikanga from the perspective of a 
Maori world view has also had a significant effect on the way that 
kaitiakitanga is interpreted and applied at common law in cases where 
there is no relevant settlement legislation. Beyond that, incorporating 
certain geographic features also engages aspects of the general law in 
their defence, such as, the right for the feature itself to apply for 
judicial review and the potential to appoint litigation guardians. Finally, 
attributing legal personality to mountains and rivers has opened up the 
prospect of attributing personality to parts of the territorial sea and the 
exclusive economic zone. 
